The Impact of Size and Age on Firm-Level Performance: Some Evidence from India by Majumdar, Sumit K.
Review of Industrial Organization 12: 231–241, 1997. 231
c 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
The Impact of Size and Age on Firm-Level
Performance: Some Evidence from India
SUMIT K. MAJUMDAR
University of Michigan, Business School, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, U.S.A.
Abstract. Using contemporary data for an extensive sample of 1020 Indian firms, this paper investi-
gates the impacts that size and age of firms have on firm-level productivity and profitability. In India
older firms are found to be more productive and less profitable, whereas the larger firms are, con-
versely, found to be more profitable and less productive. These performance differences are explained
as arising from the market-restricting industrial policies that have been followed in India over the
past three decades.
Key words: Firm-level profitability, size of firms, age of firms, Indian industry.
JEL Classification: D 21; D 24; L 52; O 53.
I. Introduction
The issues of whether larger firms are superior in performance to smaller firms,
or vice-versa, and whether older firms are superior in performance to younger
firms, or vice-versa, have generated large amounts of theoretical and empirical
research in the economics, management and sociology disciplines. Yet, the theo-
retical postulates and empirical evidence are equivocal, at best, on the impacts that
size and age have on firm-level performance, and it is likely that the true nature
of the relationship is very environment-specific, and highly dependent on a num-
ber of institutional factors which affect the performance of firms. The hypotheses
that derive from theory with respect to the impact of size and age on firms’ per-
formance are mediated by the institutional environment that firms face, and it is
feasible that the equivocality in the literature arises because institutional issues,
which necessarily are country-specific, have not been taken into account.
This paper briefly reports the results of an empirical study investigating the
impacts that size and age have on the economic performance of firms in Indian
industry. India is a unique economy in that attitudes with respect to the role and
existence of large firms in the economy have been ambivalent, while the articulation
and administration of policy have been at cross-purposes with each other (Jalan,
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1991). On one hand, the industrial policy resolution of 1956, and subsequent
follow-up legislation, envisaged a clear and important role for small private firms
in the economy and economies of scale issues were completely ignored so that in
key industrial sectors there was a preponderance of units possessing sub-optimal
scale (Little et al., 1987). Therefore, the role of the large private sector firm in the
economy was given second-class status.
On the other hand, implementation of policy left much to be desired. Private
sector industrial houses, through careful management of the political and adminis-
trative apparatus of the “license raj,” and in conjunction with the active cooperation
of a number of bureaucrats and politicians, were able to flaunt established norms
and, consequently, attain both economic power and large size (Bhagwati and Desai,
1970; Krueger, 1974; Marathe, 1989; Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987). Therefore, a
priori postulates on the relationship between size and performance in the Indian
context are difficult to articulate and the direction of the relationship must be
empirically determined.
With respect to the relationship between age and performance, in the Indian
context a-priori postulates with respect to the direction of the relationship are
likely to be equally fuzzy. India does have a tradition of indigenous industrial
development undertaken by firms in the private sector (Ray, 1979), which took
place despite the existence of a colonial regime and in 1947, at independence,
there was a large industrial sector in existence (Bagchi, 1972). Yet, in an attempt
to spur industrial progress, industrial policy during the 1960s aimed to establish
a dominant role for state-owned enterprises as the drivers of industrial progress,
and sought to downplay the role of private enterprise (Marathe, 1989). The role
of private enterprises was circumscribed by autarkic policies which fostered an
import-substituting, export-pessimistic regime, and policies by which entry and
exit into sectors of industry were controlled by the government, leaving private
enterprises no initiative to manage their operations (Mohan and Aggarwal, 1990;
Nayyar, 1994).
Attitudes of a negative nature towards allowing private industry to develop
persisted well until the late 1980s, when the realization dawned that the state-owned
enterprises were not the “crown jewels” that they were meant to be, but had become
“white elephants” (Jalan, 1991). Also, several successive Indian prime ministers
started tinkering with restrictive industrial policies in an attempt to reform. For
example, Mrs. Indira Gandhi (prime minister: 1980 to 1984) commenced “reforms
by stealth.” Her son, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi (prime minister: 1984 to 1989) continued
“reforms with reluctance” (Bhagwati, 1993). Only after the commencement of the
reforms in 1991, classified as “reforms by storm” (Bhagwati, 1993), by the Mr. P.
V. Narasimha Rao government did the realization dawn that the private sector had
a very important role to play in fueling the economic, and industrial, growth of
India.
Against the brief backdrop of the Indian industrial situation, the paper unfolds
as follows. In Section II, theoretical issues with respect to the impact that size
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and age have on firm-level performance are briefly discussed, and the section also
describes the empirical analysis carried out. Section III contains a discussion of the
results obtained, and Section IV contains a brief conclusion.
II. Theory and Empirical Analysis
1. THEORY
The size of a firm affects performance in many ways. Key features of a large firm are
its diverse capabilities, the abilities to exploit economies of scale and scope and the
formalization of procedures. These characteristics, by making the implementation
of operations more effective, allow larger firms to generate superior performance
relative to smaller firms (Penrose, 1959). Alternative points of view suggest that
size is correlated with market power (Shepherd, 1986), and along with market
power x-inefficiencies are developed, leading to relatively inferior performance
(Leibenstein, 1976). Theory, therefore, is equivocal on the precise relationship
between size and performance.
With respect to the impact of age, one stream of research suggests that older
firms are more experienced, have enjoyed the benefits of learning, are not prone to
the liabilities of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965), and can, therefore, enjoy superior
performance. Another stream of research, however, suggests that older firms are
prone to inertia, and the bureaucratic ossification that goes along with age; thus,
they are unlikely to have the flexibility to make rapid adjustments to changing
circumstances and are likely to lose out in the performance stakes to younger, and
more agile, firms (Marshall, 1920). Again, theory is equivocal.
2. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The empirical analysis is carried out against the backdrop of equivocal relationships
that extant theory provides. The economic performance of firms is captured using
two measures, productivity and profitability. While the use of a total factor produc-
tivity index will be ideal, in the data-base of Indian firms that has been acquired
the number of employees are not reported. Hence, following the example of and
the precedent set by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
[OECD] (1994), productivity is measured as the ratio of value added to the value
of production. This is not at all a precise or very satisfactory measure, but it is the
best measure that can be computed, given the data limitations that are inevitably
likely to arise especially if a large-sample data-base is collected in a developing
country context.
Following precedence in the industrial organization and management literatures
(Cowling and Waterson, 1976; Capon et al., 1990), profitability is measured as
returns on sales, or the margin on sales. An extensive firm-level data set, for 1020
Indian firms, forms the basis for empirical analysis. These data were obtained from
the Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy and supplemented by Bombay Stock
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Exchange data. Guidance in data collection was also provided by the Reserve Bank
of India. The data are cross-sectional, collected for each firm for one of the years
between 1988 and 1994, depending on the availability of all key variables and
missing value problems are sought to be avoided.
The principal independent variables are measured as follows: SIZE is measured
as the natural log of total sales, while AGE is the number of years since the inception
of the firm in the year the data are collected. However, in explanations of economic
performance a number of other factors can have an influence. These factors may be
firm-related, industry-related or related to aspects of the institutional environment.
If the impact of other factors are not controlled for, the relationship between size,
age and performance may be spurious.
Diversification by firms is one way for excess resources to be exploited, and the
subsequent foray into new lines of business increases the repertoire of total skills
and capabilities within firms, which then impacts on the total performance of the
organization. Data on sales from specific business areas, per se, are not available;
therefore, an index variable, DIVERSITY, is created, taking on the values of 0 for
no diversification, 1 for multiple lines of activities in related areas and 2 if firms
are very widely diversified. Similarly, in the Indian context a number of firms are
owned by a common industrial house, much in the manner of Korean chaebols.
Such common ownership can lead to the spillover of firm-specific capabilities
among all members of the group, with an impact on the performance of each
member. GROUP is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 if the firm belongs to
an Indian industrial group, and is 0 otherwise.
The impact of foreign ownership has to be controlled and a reason why
firms invest abroad is that they possess superior capabilities. The possession of
these capabilities may lead a firm to display superior performance relative to
domestically-controlled firms, and FOREIGN, which is a dummy variable taking
the value 1 if there is foreign ownership present in the firm and 0 if no foreign
ownership is present, is introduced into the regression. EXPORTS, which cap-
tures the export orientation of the firms studied is introduced to control for the
export orientation of Indian firms. There is no specific theory, per-se, which links
the export-orientation of firms to performance. However, if domestic and over-
seas markets are equally competitive, or both closed for that matter, differences in
competitive intensity are going to be similar and performance differences between
export-oriented and domestically-oriented firms are likely to be minimal. On the
other hand, it can be postulated that if domestic markets are controlled and closed,
as has been the case in many developing and transition economies when compared
with the export markets in which firms from these countries operate, then signif-
icantly superior performance will be noted for firms that have a relatively greater
export orientation. Thus, the impact of EXPORTS on observed performance is
postulated to be positive
The ratios of advertising, distribution and marketing expenditures to total oper-
ating expenditures, ADVERTISING, DISTRIBUTION and MARKETING, control
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at once both firm-related and industry- related factors. Some firms may spend heav-
ily on advertising, distribution and marketing activities to gain increased market
shares, with a consequent impact on profitability. The variables, therefore, capture
firm-level predilections. On the other hand, some industry-settings may require
heavier spending on advertising, distribution and marketing activities; thereby,
industry-effects are also controlled to some degree.
Another industry-related factor is capital intensity, which is measured as the ratio
of net fixed assets to total assets: CAPITAL INTENSITY. Additionally, the ratio
of inventory to total assets, INVENTORY, helps control industry-effects given
situations where some industries need greater stockholding, but business-cycle
effects are also controlled for since in downturns inventories tend to accumulate,
and vice-versa. No a-priori relationship is posited for CAPITAL INTENSITY, but
INVENTORY is expected to yield a negative relationship since the stocking of
inventories means a greater need for working-capital, higher interest costs and,
therefore, an erosion of performance.
A variable which also has attributes in controlling industry-related and business-
cycle factors is LIQUIDITY, which is the quick assets ratio or the ratio of cash
to total current liabilities. Cash requirements may be conditioned by industry
practices, but also by the overall economic climate, since in lean times cash-
flow crises can arise. Additionally, LIQUIDITY also helps capture firm-specific
attributes, since the ability to manage working capital and acquire a greater quantity
of cash balances relative to current liabilities reflects superior skills which are also
likely to be reflected in a firm’s ability to generate relatively greater profits.
SALES GROWTH, which is the rate of change in sales between the observation-
year and the preceding year also captures business-cycle effects and environmental
volatility. In markets where sales growth is high, there are possibilities for firms to
make larger profits; on the other hand, such growth trends may attract new entrants,
quite a common occurrence in India in the post-reform period, and average profits
for all players may be reduced. The actual relationship between SALES GROWTH
and performance is left to be empirically determined.
EXCISE and DEBT EQUITY are two variables controlling institutional factors
specific to India. The ratio of excise duties borne to gross sales, EXCISE, captures
the indirect tax incidence firms face. The greater the ratio, the lower the performance
since there are less incentives for firms to be commercially successful if a principal
task is being an adjunct arm of the customs and excise collecting authority. With
respect to DEBT EQUITY, in theory the greater the amount of debt, the more
stringent is the monitoring of managers and, therefore, firms’ performance will
be superior. However, in India term-lending institutions are government-owned
and the loans made to commercial firms effectively come out of public funds.
Just as state-owned enterprises are comparatively inferior in performance vis-a-vis
private sector firms, within private sector firms a greater quantum of debt will tend
to reduce incentives for superior performance, because managers will face little
accountability with respect to a large amount of capital invested in their enterprises.
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The relationship between these two variables and performance is posited to be
negative.
The ratio of imports to total operating expenses, IMPORTS, is introduced to
control the impact of import-control regimes that firms face. While greater pen-
etration of imported goods in any particular sector pressurizes domestic firms to
perform better, whether allowability of imports of raw materials and supplies by
individual firms does so is debatable. On the contrary, the existence of a quota sys-
tem and import licensing, which has been the case in India, is expected to engender
rent-seeking and the likely sign of IMPORTS is expected to be negative.
Finally, TIME is an index variable taking on the values between 0 and 5 for
each of the years 1988 to 1994, since the observations being evaluated belong to
either of these years. Time effects are thereby controlled, and whether the reforms
process has led to a structural change in performance patterns can also be tested.
If, indeed, firms have become more productive and profitable as a result of the
opening-up of the Indian markets and the fundamental shift that has been brought
about in industrial policy, then TIME, productivity and profitability will display a
positive relationship.
III. Results and Discussion
1. PRIMARY FINDINGS
Two regressions are estimated, for each of the dependent variables. The results are
shown in Table I and are obtained using the heteroscedastic-consistent covariance
matrix estimation (White, 1980) to correct for the presence of heteroscedasticity
in the data. The coefficients for SIZE are significant at the 1 percent level in
both equations, while the coefficient for AGE is significant at the 5 percent level
in explaining productivity and significant at the 1 percent level in explaining
profitability. However, it is not the significance levels that are of interest as much
as the direction of the relationships that emerge.
The coefficient for SIZE is negative in the productivity equation, but positive
in the profitability equation. Conversely, the coefficient for AGE is positive in the
productivity equation, but negative in the profitability equation. In India larger
firms are less productive, in comparison to smaller firms, while the larger firms are
more profitable. Conversely, older firms are more productive, but are less profitable
in comparison with younger firms. These principal findings can be summarized as
in Table II.
What are the implications of the above findings? The greater profitability of
the larger Indian firms is consistent with a rent-seeking perspective that has been
articulated by writers (Krueger, 1974; Marathe, 1989; Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987)
to explain industrial regression in India. Industrial licensing, as a policy instrument,
was explicitly meant to foster the growth of small-scale and medium-sized firms,
while also explicitly attempting to control monopoly power. In reality, the fact that
a lack of monitoring allowed canny entrepreneurs to exploit the system to their
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TABLE I. Regression results
Productivity Profitability
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
SIZE  1.778 3.57 1.088 3.85
AGE 0.065 2.39  0.053 3.46
DIVERSITY 1.225 1.13 0.167 0.27
GROUP 2.313 2.08  0.806 1.27
FOREIGN 0.107 3.42 0.063 3.53
EXPORTS 0.077 2.46 0.048 2.68
ADVERTISING 0.407 1.04  0.198 0.89
DISTRIBUTION  0.170 0.84 0.193 1.68
MARKETING  0.675 3.59 0.205 1.93
CAPITAL INTENSITY 0.024 0.72  0.014 0.74
INVENTORY  0.052 1.07  0.039 1.43
LIQUIDITY 16.452 10.77  0.671 0.77
SALES GROWTH  0.002 1.56  0.000 1.24
EXCISE  0.114 1.84 0.001 0.88
DEBT EQUITY  0.197 1.40  0.341 4.26
IMPORTS  5.569 1.53  4.898 2.37
TIME 0.515 1.08  0.205 0.74





p < 0:05; p < 0:10.




Size of firm Larger firms are Larger firms are
less productive more profitable
( ) (+)
Age of firm Older firms are Older firms are
more productive less profitable
(+) ( )
advantage was noted, and brought to the attention of policy-makers by perceptive
researchers such as Bhagwati and Desai (1970), with an Industrial Licensing Policy
Inquiry Committee (ILPIC; headed by Mr. S. Dutt, I.C.S.) also set up which reported
in 1969. Paranjape (1988, p. 2343), who was a member of the ILPIC, writes in
respect of the findings of the committee, that: “in respect of licensing, the system
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had failed practically on all counts : : : Licenses were issued in excess of capacity
targets even in nonessential industrial : : : Influential parties and large houses were
permitted to pre-empt capacities.”
Capacity pre-emption by large industrial houses and firms, while giving them
market power, also generated significant x-inefficiencies among these firms. X-
efficiency theory proposes that environmental forces change the nature of incentives
facing firms and permit slack-causing behavior. Licensing allowed a finite market
size to be made available to each applicant succeeding in obtaining a license,
which were principally the larger firms in India. Hence, there were no incentives for
survival in a competitive battleground. Also, the government dictated all subsequent
strategic and operational decisions for the firms which had acquired licenses to enter
particular markets; therefore, Indian firms merely had to go through the motions
of undertaking industrial activity (Bhoothalingam, 1993).
That large firms in Indian industry got away with living the “quiet life” (Hicks,
1935) seems evident from the data, because there were no reasons to minimize
costs or strive for efficiency as a result of state-legitimized market pre-emption
allowed to them and the day-to-day interference in firms’ operations by the gov-
ernment. For example, in respect of such issues, Bhagwati (1993, p. 54) has also
written that “the Indian embrace of bureaucratic controls was also encouraged by
additional objectives, none of them served well by the control system in practice.
One was the prevention of concentration of economic power, by licensing the cre-
ation and expansion of capacity. But, if monopoly power was to be reduced, the
virtual elimination of domestic and foreign competition (i.e., the elimination of
the “contestability” of the market) was hardly the way to do it.” Simultaneously,
the small-scale orientation of industrial policy, in conjunction with a policy of
industrial dispersal, also led to a fragmentation of industrial units, so that large
plants which could exploit economies of scale were not allowed to be established
(Marathe, 1989; Mazumdar, 1991).
The results for AGE run contrary to those for SIZE, and the liability of new-
ness argument may be invoked so as to explain why older firms are relatively
more productive. As a labor-surplus economy, India traditionally has had a labor-
intensive industrial sector (Goldar, 1986). Also, the importance of labor as a vital
input becomes important because of the existence of an autarkic regime which
led to the very low diffusion of modern technology, embodied in capital goods,
because of significant import restrictions that exist (Mohan and Aggarwal, 1990).
In Indian industry the management of industrial relations, therefore, was the key
to being operationally-successful, and over the years a nexus developed between
trade-union and corporate leaders (Bardhan, 1984). The existence of such a nexus
enabled corporate leaders to avoid utilization problems connected with what in
India is a key resource: manpower, since good labor-management relations were
important to get the best out of industrial operations which deployed inadequate
technology.
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The nexus developed strongly over the years, because a number of older business
groups in India had family continuity in their top management ranks, and labor
leaders, who were also major politicians in their own right, were remarkably
long-serving. These factors served to generate robust personal relationships. The
existence of personal relationships between corporate families and labor leaders
vitiated against the possibility of the management of newer industrial groups and the
existing labor leaders in joining together to enter productivity agreements, because
relationships between leaders of old-established businesses and labor leaders were
built on old-established, strong personal ties (Weiner, 1986), thus inhibiting the
newer industrial houses from getting the best out of their manpower resources. Of
course, as faster technology diffusion occurs, with the opening-up of the economy,
and Indian industry becomes more capital intensive, plus as older labor leaders
give way to a younger generation, a different empirical relationship may well be
noted between AGE and productivity.
A priori, one would also expect older firms to be more profitable because
managing the licensing process yields significant experience in pre-empting market
capacities, which can then yield superior profitability because of market capture.
However, apart from profits arising from market pre-emption activities, through
superior management of the licensing process, firms also become more profitable
because of several strategic or operational reasons, one of which is that they are able
to tap into the relevant customer segment and provide differentiated products that
meet demand. One tragedy of the autarky-oriented industrial policy regime, which
older firms have had more experience in, was the closure of the Indian economy
to competitive pressures either from domestic or foreign competitors, as a result of
which firms grew up to be strategically and operationally incompetent and unable
to develop a market orientation (Bhagwati, 1993; Bhoothalingam, 1993).
Furthermore, as Jacobsson (1991) and Mazumdar (1991) have also both demon-
strated, in respect of the engineering and textile industries, respectively, government
policies skewed business decisions, particularly by the older firms, towards patterns
of actions inconsistent with either the real needs of the market or their motivations
to earn superior profitability. Such explanations, partial though they are, may be
relevant in explaining why older firms have been less profitable in India. While
the product markets in India have opened, very gradually though given the various
start-stop episodes of reforms that Indian industry has gone through, the older firms
have been less nimble and unable to shed their monopoly-oriented mind-set. At
least the contemporary data show that older firms might seem to be unable to devel-
op the ethos of a competitive culture that is required to be successful in markets
where the concept of the consumer becomes important, and where choices are not
thrust upon the consuming public by the government, but arise from customers’
own volitions.
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2. SECONDARY FINDINGS
The coefficients of the control variables are broadly in line with expectations, and
also reflect the impact of the institutional environment. DIVERSITY turns out to
be insignificant for both dependent variables; GROUP is significant in the pro-
ductivity equation, but insignificant in the equation for profitability. FOREIGN
and EXPORTS are positive and significant in both equations; ADVERTISING is
insignificant in both equations; DISTRIBUTION is insignificant for the produc-
tivity equation, while MARKETING is significant, but negative in both equations.
CAPITAL INTENSITY is negative in both cases, INVENTORY is mildly signifi-
cant and negative only in the profitability equation, while LIQUIDITY is strongly
significant for the productivity equation, but not for profitability. SALES GROWTH
and EXCISE are negative and significant with respect to productivity, while DEBT
EQUITY and IMPORTS are negative and significant in both equations. Finally,
TIME is insignificant in either case.
The results for the control variables shed light on some of the determinants
of firm-level performance in the Indian context. Of contemporary policy interest,
however, are the results shown by the FOREIGN, EXPORTS and TIME variables.
The result for FOREIGN implies that firms in which foreign ownership exists
do out-perform domestically-owned firms. This is an important consideration for
foreign firms wishing to invest in India. Similarly, the result for EXPORTS implies
that Indian firms, whether domestically or foreign-owned, which venture abroad do
display superior economic performance. This is an important consideration since,
after decades of export pessimism, the government is actually trying to fuel export-
led growth, given the success stories of China, South Korea and Taiwan. Finally,
the insignificant results for TIME imply that the opening up of the economy after
1991 has not yet had an appreciable impact on firms’ performance.
IV. Conclusion
This paper has examined whether the size and age of firms influenced firms’
productivity and profitability, and, using a sample of 1020 Indian firms, larger
firms are found to be more productive and less profitable, whereas older firms are
more profitable and less productive. These results are attributed to the institutional
framework of the Indian economy, and industrial policy instruments, such as,
inter-alia, restrictive entry policies, are purported to account for these findings
with respect to the influences that size and age have on firm-level productivity and
profitability. The Indian case demonstrates that how size and age relates to firms’
performance cannot be analyzed outside the institutional framework that the firms
operate within.
References
Bagchi, A. (1972) Private Investment in India: 1900–1939. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
INDIA: FIRM SIZE AND AGE 241
Bardhan, P. K. (1984) The Political Economy of Development in India. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Bhagwati, J. N. (1993) India in Transition: Freeing the Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bhagwati, J. N. and P. Desai (1970) India: Planning for Industrialization. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Bhoothalingam, S. (1993) Reflections on an Era: Memoirs of an Indian Civil Servant. Madras:
Affiliated East-West Press.
Capon, N., J. Farley and H. Hoenig (1990) ‘Determinants of Financial Performance: A Meta Analysis’,
Management Science, October, pp. 1143–1159.
Cowling, K. and M. Waterson (1976) ‘Price-Cost Margins and Market Structure’, Economica, 43,
267–274.
Goldar, B. N. (1986) Productivity Growth in Indian Industry. New Delhi: Allied Publishers Private
Limited.
Hicks, J. R. (1935) ‘Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly’, Econometrica,
3, 1–20.
Jacobsson, S. (1991) ‘Government Policy and Performance of the Indian Engineering Industry’,
Research Policy, 20, 45–57.
Jalan, B. (1991) India’s Economic Crisis: The Way Ahead. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Krueger, A. O. (1974) ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society’, American Economic
Review, 64, 291–303.
Leibenstein, H. (1976) Beyond Economic Man. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Little, I. M. D., D. Mazumdar and J. M. Page, Jr. (1987) Small Manufacturing Enterprises: A
Comparative Analysis of India and Other Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marathe, S. S. (1989) Regulation and Development: India’s Policy Experience of Controls Over
Industry. New Delhi: Sage Publications Pvt. Ltd.
Marshall, A. (1920), Principles of Economics, 8th Edition. London: Macmillan.
Mazumdar, D. (1991) ‘Import-Substituting Industrialization and Protection of the Small-Scale: The
Indian Experience in the Textile Industry’, World Development, 19(9), 1197–1213.
Mohan, R. and V. Aggarwal (1990) ‘Commands and Controls: Planning for Indian Industrial Devel-
opment, 1951–1990’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 14, 681–712.
Nayyar, D. (1994) ‘Introduction’, in D. Nayyar, ed, Industrial Growth and Stagnation: The Debate
in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1994) The Performance of Foreign
Affiliates in OECD Countries, Paris.
Paranjape, H. K. (1988) ‘Indian Liberalization: Perestroika or Salami Tactics?’, Economic and Polit-
ical Weekly, Special Number, November, pp. 2341–2345.
Penrose, E. T. (1959) The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Ray, R. (1979) Industrialization in India: Growth and Conflict in the Private Corporate Sector,
1914–1947. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Rudolph, L. I. and S. H. Rudolph (1987) In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian
State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Shepherd, W. G. (1986) ‘On the Core Concepts of Industrial Economics’, in H. W. De Jong and W. G.
Shepherd, eds, Mainstreams in Industrial Organization. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Stinchcombe, A. L. (1965) ‘Social Structure and Organizations’, in J. G. March, ed, Handbook of
Organizations. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Weiner, M. (1986) ‘The Political Economy of Industrial Growth in India’, World Politics, 38, July,
pp. 596–610.
White, H. (1980) ‘A Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test
for Heteroscedasticity’, Econometrica, 41, 817–838.
